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Abstract. This article seeks to explain the dramatic rise of Pim Fortuyn’s right-wing populist
party during the campaign for the parliamentary elections in the Netherlands in 2002.
Fortuyn succeeded in attracting by far the most media attention of all political actors and his
new party won 17 per cent of the votes. This article analyses how this new populist party
managed to mobilise so much attention and support so suddenly and so rapidly. It uses the
notion of ‘discursive opportunities’ and argues that the public reactions to Pim Fortuyn and
his party played a decisive role in his ability to further diffuse his claims in the public sphere
and achieve support among the Dutch electorate.The predictions of the effects of discursive
opportunities are empirically investigated with longitudinal data from newspapers and
opinion polls.To study the dynamics of competition over voter support and over space in the
public debate during the election campaign, an ARIMA time-series model is used as well as
a negative binomial regression with lagged variables to account for the time-series structure
of the data. It is found that discursive opportunities have significantly affected the degree to
which Fortuyn was successful both in the competition for voter support, and regarding his
ability to express his claims in the media. Combining these two results, a dynamic feedback
process is identified that can explain why a stable political situation suddenly spiralled out of
equilibrium. Visibility and supportive reactions of others positively affected the opinion
polls. Consonance significantly increased Fortuyn’s claim-making; dissonance undermined it.
Furthermore, electoral support and negative claims on the issue of immigration and inte-
gration in the media by others enhanced Fortuyn’s ability to further diffuse his viewpoints
and to become the main political opinion-maker during the turbulent election campaign of
2002.
Introduction1
Until 2002, anti-immigration parties failed to make any significant impact on
elections in the Netherlands. The stunning success of right-wing populist Pim
Fortuyn in the elections of May 2002 constitutes a remarkable deviation from
the traditionally low scores of radical right parties in this country. In the
parliamentary elections of 1998, the radical right Centre Democrats of Hans
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Janmaat gained 0.6 per cent of the vote and lost the meagre three seats they
had achieved in 1994. Only a few years later, the dramatic rise of Pim Fortuyn
broke records in Dutch and European political history. The List Pim Fortuyn
(hereafter, LPF) won 26 seats, achieving by far the most impressive result ever
for a new party in Dutch national elections. Also, the parties of the incumbent
government coalition suffered an unprecedented defeat (Van Holsteyn &
Irwin 2003). Such a high percentage (30.7 per cent) of aggregated electoral
gains and losses of parties was without precedent (Van Praag 2003). The
elections were also very exceptional in an international perspective. They are
the second most volatile elections of all 248 national elections in Western
Europe between 1950 and the end of 2006 (Mair 2008). The breakthrough of
the LPF was also remarkable with regard to the role of the media. Newcomer
Pim Fortuyn was the most often mentioned politician in the media during the
election campaign, receiving 24 per cent of all attention, which is the same
amount as the politicians in the second, third, fourth and fifth positions taken
together (Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2003).
The central question of this article is how to explain this striking outcome:
what are the causes of the sudden and spectacular rise of Pim Fortuyn and his
political party? The commonsense explanation that Fortuyn’s success was a
consequence of his indisputable charisma is doubtful as such reasoning is
rather tautological (Van der Brug et al. 2005) and lacks convincing empirical
evidence (Van der Brug & Mughan 2007). Weber (1947 [1921]) noted that
charisma is an attribution to the ‘heroes of a war’. If a leader is unsuccessful,
or if the leadership fails to benefit the followers, charismatic authority
disappears.2
Nevertheless, the observation that appealing media performances of suc-
cessful party leaders of the populist right throughout Europe are often asso-
ciated with charisma offers a good starting point. Scholars of ‘contentious
politics’ have long pointed to the fact that for a satisfactory answer to ques-
tions about political change, the role of the media should be taken into account
(e.g., Gitlin 1980). We believe that using theories and findings from the social
movement field can improve our understanding of political breakthroughs as
they draw attention to the fact that it is necessary not only to explain why
anti-immigration parties are able to attract voters, but also why they are
successful in making their voices heard in the public sphere in the first place.
Therefore, our analysis of the rise of Fortuyn will refer to two elements. First,
we look at his success in public opinion, indicated by the intention to vote for
this party. Second, we analyse the public claims made by Fortuyn and his party,
which indicate the extent to which he was able to publicly express his opinions
and viewpoints in the media. Although there have been several studies that
take news coverage into account – in Belgium (Walgrave & De Swert 2004),
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Germany (Lubbers & Scheepers 2001) and the Netherlands (Boomgaarden &
Vliegenhart 2007; Lubbers 2001) – these studies only explain fluctuations in
electoral support for anti-immigration parties.
Much of the previous academic work on the rise of anti-immigration parties
has focused on the structural conditions that have facilitated their emergence
or ‘breakthrough’. It has focused on two main sets of factors: demand-side and
supply-side (for a review of recent work, see Van der Brug & Fennema 2007).
The former refers to the conditions that have created a social and cultural
‘reservoir’ to be exploited by far-right political parties, such as increased voter
volatility and the demise of party loyalty caused by the process of depillarisa-
tion (Ignazi 2003). Demand-side explanations also include value changes and
structural cleavages related to the modernisation process (e.g., Betz 1994;
Eatwell 2000). Supply-side factors include political and institutional factors
that social movement scholars have labelled ‘political opportunity structures’,
such as the structure of the electoral system, the responses of established
actors, and the dynamics of party alignment, demarcation and competition
(e.g., Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1995; Koopmans et al. 2005). These political
opportunity structures provide the radical right with a political niche to be
exploited.
We agree that these two sets of necessary conditions or facilitating factors
are relevant to understand the breakthrough of anti-immigration parties like
the LPF in the Netherlands. However, the question of how it was possible that
public opinion and the media debate could change so dramatically within such
a short time span cannot be fully answered by pointing at comparatively slow
political and institutional changes or value shifts in the electorate (likewise
Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2003: 14). Of course, structural conditions are important
to explain why certain changes are possible or likely. However, to understand
these short-term changes, it is more useful to look at aspects of political
opportunity that can, first of all, change within short periods of time and,
second, are visible for people: the public debate in the media. Political conten-
tion increasingly consists of a battle over media attention and legitimacy in the
public discourse, acted out on a public stage (Kriesi 2001), with the electorate
behaving like an audience in a theatre (Manin 1997). This is not to say that the
media determine political outcomes by themselves, but it has become more
and more the ground for power struggles ‘where different actors and strategies
are played out, with diverse skills, and with various outcomes, sometimes
resulting in unexpected consequences’ (Castells 1997: 317).
The public sphere is where political parties or social movements can test
the efficacy of different mobilisation strategies, and where opportunities and
constraints become visible by way of the public actions and reactions of other
actors. To capture this role of the public sphere, scholars have developed the
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notion of ‘discursive opportunities’ (Ferree et al. 2002; Ferree 2003; Koopmans
& Olzak 2004; Koopmans et al. 2005). In the absence of fertile structural
conditions and attendant grievances, political entrepreneurs will not be able to
mobilise public support successfully. However, such grievances, we argue, are
to an important extent amplified, and to some extent even generated, within
the public discourse. Integrating theories on social movements and media
influence, we analyse how public discourse provides opportunities for mobili-
sation. Our central argument is that, in combination with the electoral poten-
tial and the political space available, discursive opportunities help explain both
the increase in public claim-making of Pim Fortuyn, and the electoral success
of his LPF. Following this theoretical lead, we will show that the key to
understanding the rise of Fortuyn lies in the dynamics of the public debate, and
particularly in the ways in which other actors reacted to his claims.
Theoretical perspectives
Demand-side explanations: Socio-economic conditions and grievances
The process of depillarisation and de-alignment, reflected in higher voter
volatility and declining party loyalty, has caused a shift from a structured
model to what Andeweg and Irwin (2005) call an open model of electoral
competition. Voting behaviour based on class and religion has been replaced
by citizens who shop around for the most appealing party.Thus, the availability
of a potential electorate creates a ‘propitious context’ for extreme right parties
(Ignazi 2003: 206). However, although voter choice may be differently
grounded than before, ‘it has often tended to reproduce quite conventional
and historically familiar outcomes’ (Mair 2002: 125). Increased volatility
makes the Dutch electorate rather unpredictable (Mair 2008), but this does
not necessarily translate into considerable right-wing party success. Take for
example the also exceptionally volatile 1994 elections. Floating voters might as
well suddenly return to a mainstream party, as the strong gains of the Social
Democrats in 2003 show.
Another familiar argument holds that worsening economic conditions
increase dissatisfaction with an incumbent government. Yet in view of the
socioeconomic situation in the Netherlands in 2001, the claim that the rise of
Fortuyn was a result of the country’s economic performance is not convincing.
According to a survey by The Economist, the Dutch economy was remarkably
healthy at the time and experienced impressive growth under the incumbent
government.3 The unemployment rate was 6.6 per cent in 1990 (a moderate
level compared to other countries of the European Union) and declined to
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3.5 per cent in 2000 (a considerably lower rate than in most other EU member
countries) (CPB 2001).
A more convincing demand-side explanation is that immigration and cul-
tural diversity resulted in a new cleavage.Theories of ‘ethnic competition’ state
that support for radical- right parties is generated by an increased sense of
threat by immigrants (Scheepers et al. 2002). In this view, a high influx of
immigrants may increase subjective perceptions of increased ethnic competi-
tion (even if perceptions are not justified) and people become receptive to
ideologies and charismatic leaders who designate specific racial or ethnic
minorities as responsible for social problems (Eatwell 2000: 415).
Detailed investigations at the individual level seem to offer some support
for ethnic competition accounts. Voting decisions for the LPF were to an
important extent based on the content of the political issues that the LPF
advanced, most importantly its position on the issues of integration and immi-
gration (Fennema & Van der Brug 2006). Fortuyn made it acceptable to speak
publicly the previously unutterable and his views on the issues of immigration
and integration tapped into the fears of ordinary Dutch people and matched
their life experiences of minority-related crime and segregation in cities and
schools. Fortuyn’s rhetoric, which largely focused on the number of immigrants
in the country and their supposed lack of respect for the Dutch way of life,
struck a chord with some sections of the population.
However, Adriaansen et al. (2005: 234) show that the potential for the rise
of a party like the LPF had already existed for at least eight years. Support for
multiculturalism was already weak in 1994 and more than 60 per cent of the
population held the opinion that minorities had to adapt to ‘Dutch culture’
(see also CBS 2006). Coenders et al. (2006) and Fennema and Van der Brug
(2006) likewise point out that the Fortuynist potential had already been
present many years before Fortuyn entered the political stage.
Objective immigration figures do not suggest a link between the rise of the
LPF and increased ethnic competition either. Data provided by the Dutch
Bureau of Statistics (CBS 2007) show that the monthly numbers of immigrants
to the Netherlands were relatively stable during the 1990s and early 2000s.The
numbers of asylum seekers even decreased from 52,580 in 1994 to 32,550 in
2001. The number of accepted applications decreased as well. The CBS (2006)
data also show that the amount of dissatisfaction with the incumbent govern-
ment was stable at 16–18 per cent until 2002, when the figure jumped to 30 per
cent. Van der Brug (2003) shows, however, that the rise of Fortuyn from the
second half of 2001 onwards incited dissatisfaction, rather than the other way
round.
With the benefit of hindsight, the success of the LPF seems easy to under-
stand in terms of an outburst of a long-existing but unnoticed stream of
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discontent with the official political myth that Dutch multicultural policies
were a success.Yet the breakthrough calls for an explanation that goes beyond
the socio-structural model of voting behaviour since the social conditions and
electoral preferences that supposedly caused the surge of an anti-immigration
party did not vary much in time and hence cannot account for Pim Fortuyn’s
success. A primarily socio-economic or ethnic competition approach has prob-
lems explaining sudden breakthroughs and electoral dynamics (Eatwell 1998;
see also Norris 2005). We conclude that social-structural and grievance theo-
ries offer at best a partial explanation for the rise of Pim Fortuyn.
Supply-side explanations: Political opportunities
The concept of political opportunity structure (e.g., McAdam 1982; Tarrow
1994; Kriesi et al. 1995) has gained widespread popularity in the literature on
social movements. The basic idea is that the capacity to mobilise depends on
opportunities and constraints offered by the political-institutional setting.
Xenophobic and radical-right claim-making and success are affected by the
institutional characteristics of a political system (e.g., its electoral system) and
by dynamic aspects of the political process.As our case concerns developments
over time within one polity, only the second set of factors seems relevant. The
electoral system in the Netherlands (proportional representation with a low
threshold) has always offered a fertile ground for the development of new
parties, but the stable character of such explanatory factors does not make it
useful to include them in our research design.
An important factor that varies over time is whether established parties
that are in electoral competition with radical-right parties already occupy the
electoral terrain of the radical right.The average position of established parties
and the political space they leave to radical-right actors affect the openness of
a political system to new anti-immigrant parties (Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1995;
Van der Brug et al. 2005; Arzheimer & Carter 2006). Koopmans et al. (2005)
show on the basis of data for the 1990s that in the Netherlands there was a
moderate potential for the emergence of a radical-right party because estab-
lished left and right parties occupied positions relatively close to one another
on multicultural issues, leaving a space on the right that could potentially be
exploited by an anti-immigrant party. Several other authors have also pointed
to the favourable opportunity structure because of the ideological position of
the mainstream right party, the conservative-liberal VVD, which left a gap on
the right end of the electoral spectrum from which the newcomer LPF could
profit. The ‘purple government’, which brought together the social-democratic
PvdA and the VVD in one consensus-based coalition increased convergence
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in mainstream party positions (Pellikaan et al. 2003; Pennings & Keman 2003;
Van Holsteyn & Irwin 2003; Van Holsteyn et al. 2003).
Critics of political opportunity structure theory have correctly pointed out
that a factor such as ‘political space’ has no meaning if people do not become
aware of it. Such awareness must arise on the basis of information that
becomes publicly available, and the statements by and actions of elite actors
that are visible to the public. Theories of ‘discursive opportunities’ integrate
this criticism by explicating how structurally given political opportunities
become publicly visible. This argument starts from the assumption that the
public sphere is a bounded space for political communication characterised by
a high level of competition (Hilgartner & Bosk 1988). Just as protests that
receive no media coverage at all are, in the words of Gamson and Wolfsfeld
(1993: 116), ‘nonevents’, regime weaknesses and openings that do not become
publicly visible may be considered ‘non-opportunities’, which for all practical
purposes might as well not exist at all. Only a minority of all attempts at public
claim-making receive the media attention that is necessary to reach wider
audiences. We define ‘discursive opportunities’ as the aspects of the public
discourse that determine a message’s chance of success in the public sphere
(Koopmans 2004; Koopmans & Olzak 2004).
From communications and media research we know that the ‘news values’
of journalists shape the decisions that make a given story newsworthy
(Galtung & Ruge 1965; Harcup & O’Neill 2001). The actions of gatekeepers
produce the first and most basic type of discursive opportunity that we can
distinguish: visibility. Visibility depends on the number of communicative
channels by which a message is included and the prominence of such inclusion.
Visibility is a necessary condition for a message to influence the public dis-
course, and, other things being equal, the amount of visibility that gatekeepers
allocate to a message increases its potential to diffuse further in the public
sphere (Koopmans 2004; Koopmans & Olzak 2004).
We envision the communication environment of any particular public actor
as the source of two further types of discursive opportunity and constraint: the
amount and character of public responses. Political newcomers are likely to
remain stillborn if they do not succeed in provoking reactions from other
actors in the public sphere. We refer to the degree to which an actor and his
messages provoke such reactions as ‘resonance’. In the eyes of journalists and
editors, messages that resonate, whether negatively or positively, become more
relevant and the actors behind them more prominent, which increases the
speaker’s chances to gain more space for his or her opinions.
Following the dictum ‘any publicity is good publicity’ it may sometimes not
matter whether reactions are supportive or critical, but often the extent to
which the responses are negative or positive is likely to be relevant. We call
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expressions of support ‘consonance’, and rejections of an actor’s claims ‘disso-
nance’ (see likewise Koopmans & Olzak 2004). Public statements of support
for an actor’s claims will often not appear out of the blue, but in reaction to
critical remarks by others on these claims.
According to Fennema and Van der Brug (2006), one of the main reasons
that the earlier radical-right party of Hans Janmaat failed was that its message
had been widely and consistently delegitimised and considered ‘politically
incorrect’ by all other actors in the public debate. By contrast, they see For-
tuyn’s success as resulting from the fact that he had the image of a ‘normal’
democratic politician. Thus, we expect that consonance was beneficial for
Fortuyn’s ability to air his views publicly and dissonance was harmful.
We extend the above arguments by hypothesising that visibility and con-
sonance will not only improve, and dissonance reduce, the opportunities for an
actor to further increase the frequency of his publicly visible claims, but also
help improve an actor’s support in opinion polls. We claim that right-wing
populist actors who receive prominent media attention (visibility), draw many
positive reactions from other political actors (consonance) and receive few
criticisms (dissonance) will be more successful in mobilising voter support.
Research design: Data and variables
To obtain data on the discursive opportunity variables and the claim-making of
Fortuyn, we used content analysis. Data were retrieved from articles in two
national newspapers: the liberal NRC Handelsblad and the conservative
Telegraaf (using the Lexis Nexis database). As these two papers are rather
distinctive in terms of their so-called ‘popular’ or ‘quality’ character (i.e., the
emphasis on entertainment versus political information), as well as the back-
ground of their readers (Bakker & Scholten 1999), we believe we have cap-
tured a representative picture of the Dutch public debate in the written press.
We used political claim analysis, which finds its origin in social movement
research (Koopmans & Statham 1999; Koopmans et al. 2005: 23–27).
A ‘claim’ is defined as ‘a unit of strategic action in the public sphere that
consists of the purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls to
action, proposals, criticism, or physical attacks, which actually or potentially
affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors’
(Koopmans et al. 2005: 24). A typical claim consists of an actor (the subject)
undertaking some sort of strategic political action to get another actor (the
addressee) to do something regarding a third actor (the object). Claims must
be the result of purposive action and political in nature. Examples of coded
claims are ‘Balkenende [party leader of the Christian Democrats] rejects the
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principles of multiculturalism and thinks a civics course should become com-
pulsory’, or ‘Hans Wiegel [ex-leader of the VVD] blames Fortuyn for being a
populist and states that Fortuyn’s ideas are built on quicksand. He summons
Dijkstal [the current VVD leader] to finally address Fortuyn.’
The temporal frame of our analysis runs from the third week of August
2001 – when Fortuyn announced his entry into politics – through the first week
of May 2002 – just before the murder of Fortuyn on 6 May. For this period,
three experienced coders (MA students in social sciences) and the second
author scanned all issues of the two newspapers and identified and coded 1,056
claims, which are divided into three categories: 115 were statements made by
Fortuyn and his party (irrespective of the substantive issue); 715 were reac-
tions to him or his party (again irrespective of the substantive issue); and
another 226 were negative claims by other actors on immigration and the
multicultural society. A claim is not identical to an individual statement – for
example, a press conference or interview is coded as one strategic action in the
public discourse (although several different topics might be addressed and
different persons might be criticised).The inter-coder reliability test conducted
on a randomly selected subsample of issues of NRC Handelsblad showed
satisfactory agreement on the identification of articles (90.1 per cent), as well
as claims within articles (88.0 per cent).Agreement scores for variables used in
the analysis ranged from 87.5 to 100.0 per cent.4 Variables were aggregated to
weekly scores, implying that the unit of analysis is a combination of time and
score. The time sequence is a critical element in determining causation and
crucial to analyse changes.
Dependent variables
The variable Public claim-making by Fortuyn is the weekly count of the
number of claims made by Fortuyn and his party. For the variable Public
opinion on Fortuyn, we use data gathered by the polling agency Interview/NSS.
Their Political Barometer measures levels of support for the various parties per
week during the period under investigation. This gives a reliable and valid
picture of the amount of support among the Dutch electorate for all political
parties. The results of these polls are reported every Friday, which is why we
have chosen Saturdays as the demarcation line between weeks (our units of
observation). Support for Fortuyn is measured by the percentage of people
that reported the intention to vote for Leefbaar Nederland (Liveable Nether-
lands, hereafter LN) or the LPF when asked for their party choice if parlia-
mentary elections were to be held the next day.
At the end of August 2001, Fortuyn announced his intention to join a
political party and enter the political arena, most likely with LN. We will
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consider a voting intention for LN as support for Fortuyn from that moment
on. In the second week of February 2002, Fortuyn was forced to step down as
leader of LN after an interview in the Volkskrant in which he called Islam a
‘backward’ religion. Immediately after Fortuyn’s ejection from LN, many com-
mentators thought that his short political career was over. However, Fortuyn
founded his own party (the LPF) two days later. We will still consider a voting
intention for both the LN and LPF as support for Fortuyn during the three
weeks after these events, in particular because Fortuyn remained the party
leader of Leefbaar Rotterdam (the local branch of LN) for the municipal
elections of 6 March. For many voters it may have been unclear during this
period whether or not Fortuyn was still associated with LN. After the munici-
pal elections, only the support for the LPF was included in the dependent
variable.5
Independent variables
Discursive opportunities are measured by: the amount of visibility in the
media; the amount of dissonance in the media; and the amount of consonance
in the media. ‘Visibility’ is defined as the extent to which the claims made by
Fortuyn are visible in the newspapers. Our measure of visibility distinguishes
claims that were reported prominently from those that were reported less
prominently. We combine different elements of prominence into a composite
indicator: Is the claim reported on the front page?; Is the claim the first claim
mentioned in the article?; Is the claim referred to in the headline of the
article?; Does the claim appear in both newspapers?; and How many times is
the claim repeated in follow-up articles?6 The variable consists of the summed
score on each of the items and has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.67, which is
evidence of a fair scale and indicates acceptable reliability.7 To avoid overlap
between the dependent and independent variables, the total amount of visibil-
ity in a week is divided by the number of claims made by Fortuyn. In other
words, our visibility measure indicates the average visibility of the claims made
by Fortuyn in a given week.
In order to distinguish the amount of resonance from the degree to which
public reaction was supportive or critical, resonance is captured by two sepa-
rate variables. Dissonance counts the number of negative reactions by other
actors to Fortuyn. All instances of critical claim-making that are directed to or
referring to Fortuyn and his political party are included. This can also be an
indirect reaction, for instance, when someone urges the leader of the Social
Democratic Party to take a stronger stance against the viewpoints of Fortuyn.
Consonance is measured by coding the extent to which Fortuyn and his
party are supported. A claim that expresses an ambivalent or neutral position
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was also counted as consonance as we assume that such reactions – although
not unequivocally supportive – enhanced the legitimacy of his political
message.
In terms of Negative claims on immigration and integration, one of For-
tuyn’s unique selling points was his viewpoint on the issue of the multicultural
society. It may have been the case that other actors created further opportu-
nities for Fortuyn by also making restrictive claims about immigration and
integration. For that reason, the number of negative claims on immigration or
integration during a week will be taken into account. To avoid confounding of
independent and dependent variables, claims made by Fortuyn on this issue
were excluded from this variable. This is in line with the combination of the
agenda-setting theory and issue ownership theory that Walgrave and De Swert
(2004) have elaborated. They found that when the media reported more on
immigrants and asylum seekers, more voters expressed a preference for the
party that ‘owns’ this issue – in this case, the right-wing populist Vlaams Blok
in Belgium. Alternatively, restrictive claims on the issue of the multicultural
society may also have undermined Fortuyn’s uniqueness in this regard and
thereby reduced his opportunities to make further claims.
As regards The impact of 9/11, we use a dummy variable to capture the
effect of a potentially influential event that took place during the election
campaign: the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11 (week 4
in our data). We explored both the temporary and the permanent effect of this
event.The dummy variable applicable for an event with a temporal effect is set
equal to 1 in that particular week. Modelling a permanent effect entails that
the time period is divided into two parts: before (score 0) and after the event
(score 1).
With Unemployment and immigration, data were retrieved from the Dutch
Bureau of Statistics (CBS 2006, 2008).8 Because these are monthly figures, an
interpolation procedure was carried out to create weekly rates.
Analysis and results
Determinants of public opinion support for Fortuyn
We start our analysis with support for Fortuyn in public opinion polls as the
dependent variable. To estimate the effects of the media variables, immigra-
tion, unemployment and the attacks of September 11 on public opinion during
the election campaign, we use Box-Jenkins transfer modelling (see McCleary
& Hay 1980). The first step in order to derive an ARIMA model is to check
whether variables in the model have stationary means and variances. An
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inspection of the opinion poll series shows that the variance and mean of the
time series increase as the level of the series increases.This is also what a graph
of the polls indicates (see Figure 1). The time series is made stationary by
log-transformation and differencing. The explanatory variables are likewise
inspected, and logged and differenced in case of non-stationarity.9 The most
common unit-root test is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, which shows that
none of the variables contains a unit root (which implies that all series are now
stationary).
The second step is an inspection of the autocorrelation and partial auto-
correlation functions of the dependent variable. These functions show a single
spiking (and almost significant) ACF at lag 1 and decaying PACFs, which
indicates a moving average component with lag 1.A univariate ARIMA model
shows a significant coefficient for a moving average parameter at lag 1. The
residuals are ‘white noise’, which means that there is no remaining autocorre-
lation in the residuals. Similar ‘noise models’ were developed for all indepen-
dent variables in the analysis except for the dummy 9/11 intervention
variable.10
Table 1 shows the results of the first model with the predicted impact of the
9/11 attacks, the unemployment rate and immigration. The interpretation of
the results depends on the fact that the dependent variable is differenced
(Enders 2004: 257). An independent variable has the effect of increasing the
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Figure 1. Percentage of voters intending to vote for Pim Fortuyn per week (August 2001–
May 2002).
Note: Week 1 starts 18 August 2001.
Source: Interview/NSS.
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change in the dependent variable by a certain amount of units: a significant
positive predictor has an influence on Fortuyn’s popularity growth. In this
model it is assumed that 9/11 has a long-term (permanent) impact with a delay
of one week and therefore the intervention is lagged one period. However, the
table shows that the intervention does not have a significant effect. An alter-
native model (not shown in the table) in which it is assumed that 9/11 only had
a temporary effect leads to the same conclusion.We also have to conclude that
unemployment and immigration have not affected the opinion polls during the
election campaign. For immigration, this is hardly surprising since, as we indi-
cated earlier, the rise of Pim Fortuyn occurred during a period when immi-
gration figures had already been on the decline for about two years.
Unemployment did increase slightly during Fortuyn’s rise, but on a very low
level, from 3.5 per cent in August 2001 to 3.9 per cent in May 2002.
In the second model in Table 1, the other explanatory variables are added.
Adding these variables increases the explanatory power of the model as indi-
cated by the mean square root of the squared residuals summed over all time
periods (RMS) – the standard goodness of fit measure in time-series analysis
(Clarke et al. 1990). The RMS decreases from 0.040 to 0.025. The smaller the
RMS, the smaller the error and the better the fit of the model. Also, a lower
AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) points to a better fit of the model.11
As expected, the public discourse has a significant influence on the polls.
First of all, it is important to note that the amount of claim-making by Fortuyn
Table 1. Determinants of public opinion support for Pim Fortuyn, 2001–2002
Model 1
coefficient t-value
Model 2
coefficient t-value
Moving average (t–1) -0.47*** -3.21 -0.59*** -3.94
9/11(t–1) 0.07 0.38 0.08 0.50
Unemployment (t–1) 1.55 0.74 0.71 0.35
Immigration (t–1) -0.52 -0.45 -1.27 -1.25
Claims Fortuyn (t–1) 0.04 0.83
Visibility (t–1) 0.06*** 3.03
Consonance (t–2) 0.07** 2.13
Dissonance (t–2) -0.01 -0.31
Negative claims immigration (t–1) -0.01 -1.42
RMS 0.040 0.029
AIC -10.98 -18.04
N (weeks) 38 38
Notes: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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as such does not have any effect, which means that he was not able to boost
electoral support just by airing his views in the public sphere. He depended on
discursive opportunities provided by others: visibility and consonance have
significant positive effects and lead to increases in public support for Fortuyn.
The impact of the variables on the polls is lagged, and strongest at the first lag
(for visibility) and the second lag (for consonance). Dissonance does not have
a significant effect. This implies that efforts of other political actors to delegiti-
mise Fortuyn by making negative claims about him or his party in the public
sphere did not undermine public opinion support for Fortuyn. On the contrary,
negative reactions may have been counterproductive because criticism might
have encouraged other actors to stick up for Fortuyn (thereby increasing the
amount of consonance) and journalists to present further messages by Fortuyn
more prominently (increasing visibility).
These results are largely in line with those of Kleinnijenhuis et al. (2003:
117), although they only analysed the average balance of support and criticism
(on a scale from -1 to +1), not the absolute number of supportive and critical
statements.12 As in our results, they find a positive net effect of support by
political actors on the intention to vote for Fortuyn, which is mediated by
respondents’ assessment of Fortuyn’s media performance.13
A change in the amount of negative claims on immigration or integration
does not turn out to be significant.14 Other Dutch studies that take media
coverage into account do not give an entirely consistent picture.Lubbers (2001)
does not find an (additional) effect of the number of articles on asylum seekers
on the amount of support for the Dutch extreme right during the 1990s.
However, including the Fortuyn period, Boomgaarden and Vliegenhart (2007)
show for 1990–2002 a positive influence of issue attention on anti-immigration
party success (with a time lag of three months). The differences in outcomes
might be due to the research design that focuses more on long-term effects.
Determinants of Fortuyn’s claim-making success
As our second dependent variable we now turn to the investigation of the rate
of claim-making by Fortuyn – that is, the successful attempts by Fortuyn to air
his views. Figure 2 shows the amount of claims made by Fortuyn in our two
media sources for each week. This variable is an event count, which has the
characteristic that its values are discrete and non-negative.King (1989) explains
why in that case an ordinary least squares regression (OLS) is inappropriate
(King also presents a good discussion and application of event count data).
In addition, we are confronted with over dispersion in the dependent
variable, which means that we are more likely to see both a large number of
low counts and a number of very high counts, as is shown in Figure 3. Some
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30 per cent of the weeks have a zero score, which means that in these weeks
Fortuyn was not able to insert any new claims into the public discourse. In
over-dispersed data there is positive contagion across events, and one count
(observation) increases the likelihood of observing additional events in the
same period.15 This positive contagion implies that we have more variability
than for an independent Poisson process, and therefore we will use a negative
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Figure 2. Weekly count of the number of claims by Pim Fortuyn (August 2001–May 2002).
Note: Week 1 starts 18 August 2001.
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Figure 3. Density distribution of the weekly number of claims made by Pim Fortuyn.
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binomial distribution for the dependent variable instead (Long & Freese
2006). To model the time-series character of these event counts, we include a
lagged dependent variable event count as a regressor in the model.
Table 2 shows the results of a negative binomial regression model with the
number of claims by Fortuyn as the dependent variable. In the first model, only
9/11 (with a long duration effect), unemployment, immigration and a first-
order autoregression of the dependent variable are included. We find both an
autoregressive effect and a strong relationship between a change in the unem-
ployment rate and the amount of claims by Fortuyn in the subsequent week.
The second step is to investigate the effects of the discursive opportunity
variables. This second model includes the amount of negative claims by other
actors on immigration and integration as well as support for Fortuyn in
opinion polls. The model fit statistics (Wald Chi2 and log pseudo-likelihood)
point to a better model. After adding these variables, both the autoregressive
effect and the impact of unemployment are no longer significant.
It appears from our second model that there is no relationship between the
degree of visibility of the claims of Fortuyn and the number of public claims by
him one week later. Resonance, however, has a significant impact, as in the
earlier analysis with opinion polls as the dependent variable. Negative reac-
tions significantly decreased the rate of claims by Fortuyn that made it into the
media. The reverse is also true: support for Fortuyn in the public debate
Table 2. Determinants of the rate of publicised claim-making by Pim Fortuyn, 2001–2002
Model 1
coefficient z-value
Model 2
coefficient z-value
Claims Fortuyn (t–1) 0.07** 2.21 0.06 1.50
9/11(t–1) 1.33 1.19 0.69 0.59
Unemployment (t–1) 4.25** 2.20 1.27 0.60
Immigration (t–1) 0.00 -0.36 0.00 0.16
Visibility (t–1) 0.14 0.75
Consonance (t–1) 0.02* 1.76
Dissonance (t–1) -0.03** -2.19
Negative claims immigration (t–1) 0.07*** 2.66
Opinion polls (t–1) 0.11* 1.65
Constant -15.12* -1.75 -6.55 -0.76
Log pseudo-likelihood -72.18 -67.18
Wald Chi2 28.37*** 57.96***
N (weeks) 38 38
Notes: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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increased his ability to express his viewpoints through the print media in the
subsequent week. The results also show a strong positive influence of the
number of negative immigration claims.This means that other actors enhanced
Fortuyn’s opportunities for claim-making by also making restrictive claims
about immigration and integration. Support for Fortuyn in public opinion polls
also had a positive effect on his subsequent rate of claim-making. The general
conclusion is that approval (as indicated by opinion poll support from the
general public, supportive statements by other actors in the media and absence
of critical reactions) enables a new political party to further make its stand-
points heard in the public sphere.
Summary and concluding remarks
In this article, we set out to examine the spectacular rise in the Netherlands
of the new populist right party headed by the charismatic Pim Fortuyn in
2002. Pim Fortuyn succeeded in attracting by far the most media attention of
all politicians and out of the blue the LPF won 17 per cent of the votes.
Dissatisfaction with multicultural policies offered a fertile ground for a
populist anti-immigration party, but these longstanding grievances fail to
explain the explosive political career of Fortuyn. The immigration figures
were relatively stable during the 1990s and had been declining since 2000,
and the country’s economy was healthy. Research shows that long before
the emergence of Fortuyn, there was an electoral potential for an anti-
immigration party.
The political opportunity structure perspective adds to our understanding
of the potential for a radical-right party. One of the most relevant facilitating
factors for the emergence of the radical right is the political space made
available to it by the policy positions of mainstream parties. However, empiri-
cal evidence suggests that such an electoral niche had already been present
much longer. During the election campaign of 1998, the Dutch political elite
was still able to stick to its commitment to multiculturalism by mobilising
‘political correctness’ to delegitimise the then active anti-immigration party.
Like the grievance and ethnic threat arguments, the political opportunity
perspective is useful to identify the existence of an electoral potential, but it
cannot explain why this potential lay fallow for so long and was then so
suddenly and spectacularly seized upon by Pim Fortuyn.
Similarly, it should be stressed that we do not see the availability of facili-
tating political conditions that are stable or only gradually change over longer
periods of time, like an electoral system with proportional representation and
a low threshold, as irrelevant. The same is true for socio-economic factors or
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the long-term decline in party loyalty, which can identify electoral potentials.
However, such slowly shifting variables fail to account for sudden break-
throughs and short-term electoral changes.
We have advanced the argument that electoral potentials and political
opportunities have to be made visible in the public discourse in order to
become behaviourally relevant.We use the notion of ‘discursive opportunities’
to capture the publicly visible opportunities and constraints for the claim-
making behaviour of political parties. We have shown that indeed media
attention for Pim Fortuyn and the public reactions to his party played a
decisive role in explaining the remarkable degree to which he was able to
mobilise support and express his claims in the public sphere. Applying this
perspective to the explanation of both support for Fortuyn in opinion polls and
his claim-making success in the media, we showed that visibility, consonance
and dissonance were relevant for understanding the rise of Pim Fortuyn and
his party.
Public visibility and consonance in the media significantly affected public
opinion support for Fortuyn. Support by other actors in the public sphere was
beneficial, but criticism was not harmful for his position in the weekly polls.
Ventilating critical reactions in order to undermine the legitimacy of political
opponents may have partly backfired. Negative reactions to Fortuyn could
serve as an important indirect channel that, contrary to the intention of those
who criticised Fortuyn, partly boosted popular support for him by creating
more consonance and visibility for his claims.
With regard to Fortuyn’s own claim-making success, we found, however,
that critical claims referring to Fortuyn were effective to the extent that they
decreased the rate at which he was able to air his positions publicly.Also in line
with our expectations, consonance put Fortuyn in a more favourable position.
Visibility did not have a direct impact on Fortuyn’s claim-making, although it
was relevant in an indirect sense by increasing his support in opinion polls. One
of Fortuyn’s unique selling points – his position on the issue of the multicul-
tural society – was not undermined when other actors also made restrictive
statements about immigration and integration. On the contrary, they created
further opportunities for claim-making by Fortuyn. The opinion polls also had
a positive effect: the more support for Fortuyn in the polls, the more space was
given to him to express his views in the media.
Combining the results for the two dependent variables, we can identify a
dynamic feedback process in which the reactions by the media and by other
politicians to Fortuyn (visibility and consonance) raised his popularity among
the electorate. In turn, Fortuyn′s support in opinion polls, combined with direct
support that he drew from other political actors and failed attempts by other
politicians to steal his thunder by also making anti-immigrant claims, raised the
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rate of claims by him that made it into the media. When other political actors
again reacted to Fortuyn’s increased public profile, and the media presented
his claims more prominently, the spiral of discursive escalation was given a
further swing and his star rose yet further in the opinion polls.
This feedback chain explains why political relations that had been rela-
tively stable, and an election campaign that was expected by most observers to
become very dull, suddenly spiralled out of equilibrium and gave rise to the
greatest landslide in Dutch electoral history. Our results are thus in accord
with the ‘punctuated equilibrium’ view on policy shifts, which Baumgartner
and Jones (1993) borrowed from evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould
(e.g., Gould 1989). We believe that the relevance of these findings and the
theoretical perspective of discursive opportunities that accounts for them
extend beyond the case of Pim Fortuyn and can add to a more general under-
standing of the dynamics of sudden political transformations, shifts, break-
throughs and breakdowns. It could be fruitful to test empirically the short-term
discursive mechanisms we identified for the breakthroughs of right-wing popu-
list parties in other European countries. For example, Art (2007) states that the
difference in success for the extreme right between Germany and Austria –
two politically and socio-economically similar countries – is due to the differ-
ent nature of the reactions from other political parties, the media and civil
society. The incessant campaign (especially of the Bild Zeitung) against the
German Republikaner Party led to the collapse of the party very shortly after
its appearance, while Jörg Haider of the Austrian Freedom Party profited from
‘free advertising’ by Austria’s largest newspaper. Rydgren (2005) argues that
the emergence of the right-wing populist party New Democracy in Sweden can
be partly explained by the evolution from only two public television channels
in the 1980s to a variety of commercial channels in the 1990s, which increased
the opportunities for visibility for the new political contender. Likewise, one of
the reasons the Danish People’s Party was electorally successful was that it was
given a great deal of media coverage – for example, many items dealing with
immigration issues included statements and comments of party representa-
tives (Rydgren, 2004).
The success or failure of populist right parties throughout Europe is often
associated with the (lack of a) charismatic personality of their leaders. We
argued that such post-hoc attributions run the risk of circular reasoning and
therefore cannot offer a satisfactory explanation for electoral breakthroughs
(see also Van der Brug & Mughan 2007). Our results suggest that charisma is
better seen as an emergent property that is part of what needs to be explained.
In this view, charisma depends as much, or more, on the actions and reactions
of other political and media actors than on the personality, skills, and tactics of
populist political entrepreneurs.
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Notes
1. Both authors contributed equally to this manuscript. The order of names is strictly
alphabetical.
2. Weber illustrates this by noting that even Chinese monarchs could sometimes lose their
status as a ‘son of heaven’ because of misfortune, such as defeat in war, floods or drought.
For more recent examples of instability, see Collins (2004).
3. The Economist, 4 May 2002.
4. The codebook and more detailed information on the reliability of the coding of claims
are available online at: www.jaspermuis.com.
5. We performed our analyses also including a dummy variable for the three weeks after
the resignation of Fortuyn as leader of LN and until the municipal elections in order to
check whether our decision on how to deal with this confusing period had affected
our results. The results are, however, very similar and the dummy variable is not
significant.
6. The rate of repetition was logged. It is measured independently of resonance because
repetitions that occurred in the context of direct reactions to Fortuyn’s statements were
excluded.
7. We additionally considered the item ‘Is there a photograph illustrating the claim?’,
which was, however, removed from the scale because it correlated very poorly with other
items and thus seems to refer to a different dimension of prominence.
8. Instead of monthly immigration figures, we also considered the monthly influx of asylum
seekers. However, asylum seeker numbers show a similar declining trend as the general
immigration figures and using this variable instead of total immigration does not influ-
ence the results.
9. In order to achieve stationarity, the following independent variables were trans-
formed: unemployment (differenced), consonance and dissonance (logged and differ-
enced). Additional analysis shows that differencing and/or logging the indepen-
dent variables that were not differenced and/or log-transformed does not alter our
results.
10. See McCleary and Hay (1980: 243) for a good discussion of why the relationship can only
be interpreted when the cause variable is a white noise process.
11. The Ljung-Box Q statistic, which tests the significance of autocorrelation at each lag
(see, e.g., Enders 2004), indicates the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals for all
models. Its significance value is less than or equal to 0.05 for twenty lags.
12. It should also be noted that they analyse the period starting at the end of February 2002
(a major part of Fortuyn’s meteoric rise took place earlier).
13. In our study, positive and negative reactions only refer to political strategic statements.
Kleinnijenhuis et al. (2003) find that shifts in vote preferences are also significantly
affected by the nature of ‘objective’ news on real-life developments.
14. Even if we only add this variable to Model 1, media attention for the issue of
immigration does not have a significant effect on Fortuyn’s success in the opinion
polls.
15. An illustration of over dispersion because of positive contagion is counting antelopes.
Antelopes are herd animals, and when you see one, you will probably observe more.This
violates the assumption that one event has no effect on the likelihood of observing
additional events in the same period.
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